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SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
In the area of civil litigation, the Court of Appeals, in Martin
v. Edwards Labs, determined that under CPLR 214(5), the statute
of limitations for personal injury actions involving the malfunc-
tioning of prosthetic or contraceptive devices accrues at the time of
actual injury. In so holding, the Court rejected the argument that
accrual should commence at the time of the plaintiff's discovery of
the injury. In Kelly v. State Insurance Fund, the Court, balancing
the equities in the apportionment of workers' compensation litiga-
tion costs, held that an employer or compensation carrier's contri-
bution toward an employee's cost of effectuating a recovery against
a third party should be assessed in accordance with the total bene-
fit inuring to the employee.
In the only Appellate Division case discussed in this issue, the
Second Department, in Conner v. Conner, concluded that a profes-
sional degree received by a spouse during the life of a marriage is
not marital property as defined by section 236(B) of the DRL. In
turn, the court reasoned, such degree is not subject to apportion-
ment during a divorce proceeding.
It is our hope that the discussion of the cases contained in The
Survey will be of interest and value to the New York bench and
bar.
CIVIL PRACTICE LAw AND RuLES
CPLR 214(5): Cause of action for injuries suffered due to defec-
tive prosthetic or contraceptive device accrues upon the date of
the injury-producing malfunction
Section 214 of the CPLR provides that a personal injury ac-
tion must be commenced within three years.1 In applying this gen-
I CPLR 214(5) (McKinney Supp. 1983-1984). Prior to the enactment of the CPLR, the
Civil Procedure Act contained a 3-year statute of limitations if the injury resulted from
negligence and a 6-year statute for all other personal injury actions. See Blessington v. Mc-
Crory Stores Corp., 198 Misc. 291, 301, 95 N.Y.S.2d 414, 423-24 (Sup. Ct. Queens County
1950), aff'd, 279 App. Div. 807, 110 N.Y.S.2d 456 (2d Dep't 1952), aff'd, 305 N.Y. 140, 111
N.E.2d 421 (1953). Compare CPA § 49(6) (repealed 1963) with id. § 48(3) (repealed 1963).
Consolidation of the sections was motivated by a desire to avoid uncertainty. See Izquiesdo
v. Cities Service Oil Co., 244 F. Supp. 758, 761 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); SECOND REP., 71, 533-37 1
WK&M 214.12.
In general, statutes of limitation are designed to ensure fairness to defendants. See De-
velopments in the Law - Statute of Limitations, 63 HARv. L. Rav. 1177, 1178 (1950). De-
lineating specific limitation periods protects defendants from difficulties arising from stale
claims such as lost evidence, faded memories, and unavailable witnesses. Id. at 1185; see,
e.g., Meyer v. Frank, 550 F.2d 726, 730 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 830 (1977); Lee v.
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eral provision, however, courts often have had difficulty determin-
ing when the cause of action actually accrued, especially when
some significant amount of time has elapsed between the plaintiff's
initial contact with a defective product and the subsequent mani-
festation of harm.2 Depending on the facts, accrual is said to result
either when some injury to the plaintiff has occurred,3 or when the
plaintiff has discovered the harm.4 Arguably, it is inequitable to fix
United States, 485 F. Supp. 883, 885 (E.D.N.Y. 1980); Connel v. Hayden, 83 App. Div. 2d
30, 40-44, 443 N.Y.S.2d 383, 392 (2d Dep't 1981).
2 See McLaren, The Impact of Limitation Periods on Actionability in Negligence, 7
ALBERTA L. REV. 247, 247 (1969); Developments in the Law-Statutes of Limitations, 63
H~Av. L. REv. 1177, 1200-07 (1950). The problem of determining an accrual date when the
manifestation of injury occurs some time after contact with the harmful substance was first
addressed by New York courts in Schmidt v. Merchants Despatch Transp. Co., 270 N.Y.
287, 200 N.E. 824 (1936). In Schmidt, the-plaintiff contracted a lung disease many years
after inhaling dust particles while in the defendant's employ. Id. at 297, 200 N.E. at 827.
The Court, noting that "[t]he injury occurs when there is a wrongful invasion of personal or
property rights," held the cause of action had accrued at the moment the plaintiff inhaled
the dust. Id.
Upon considering the applicable statute of limitations for an action based on strict
products liability, the New York Court of Appeals in Victorson v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co.,
37 N.Y.2d 395, 335 N.E.2d 275, 373 N.Y.S.2d 39 (1975), held that it commences at the time
of injury. Id. at 399, 335 N.E.2d at 276, 373 N.Y.S.2d at 40. Victorson explicitly overruled
Mendel v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 25 N.Y.2d 340, 253 N.E.2d 207, 305 N.Y.S.2d 490
(1969), in which the Court held that such an action was based on a warranty theory and,
therefore, the limitations period began to run on the date of the sale. Id. at 344, 253 N.E.2d
at 210, 305 N.Y.S.2d at 493; see Victorson, 37 N.Y.2d at 404, 335 N.E.2d at 279, 373
N.Y.S.2d at 44. In addition, the problem has arisen in the context of medical malpractice
actions, and in limited contexts, a discovery rule has been adopted. See, e.g., Flanagan v.
Mount Eden Gen. Hosp., 24 N.Y.2d 427, 428, 248 N.E.2d 871, 873, 301 N.Y.S.2d 23, 23, cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 837 (1969). In Flanagan, the plaintiff's claim was not time-barred despite
the fact that surgical clamps were found in his abdomen 8 years after an operation had been
performed in the defendant's hospital. Id.
8 See Thorton v. Roosevelt Hosp., 47 N.Y.2d 780, 781, 391 N.E.2d 1002, 1003, 417
N.Y.S.2d 920, 921 (1979). When injury results from the "inhalation, ingestion or injection"
of harmful substances, the statute of limitations has been held to run "from the last expo-
sure to the substance." Id. Courts have commonly held that initial contact exists when some
actual injury has occurred. See, e.g., Steinhardt v. Johns-Mannville Corp., 54 N.Y.2d 1008,
1010, 430 N.E.2d 1297, 1299, 446 N.Y.S.2d 244, 246 (cause of action accrues upon inhalation
of asbestos particles), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 967 (1981); Reis v. Pfizer, Inc., 48 N.Y.2d 664,
664, 397 N.E.2d 390, 390, 421 N.Y.S.2d 879, 879 (1979) (limitations period runs from inges-
tion of oral polio vaccine); Manno v. Levi, 94 App. Div. 2d 556, 573, 465 N.Y.S.2d 219, 229
(2d Dep't 1983) (action accrues at ingestion of DES).
' See CPLR 214-b (McKinney Supp. 1983-1984). Personal injury suits by Vietnam vet-
erans based on contact with Agent Orange may be brought within 2 years after the injury is
discovered. Id.; Farrel, Civil Practice, 1981 Survey of New York Law, 33 SYRACUSE L. REV.
31, 33 (1981). In addition, when a foreign object is left in the body or where a plaintiff has
undergone "continuous treatment," an action may be brought within 1 year after the foreign
object is discovered, despite the strict 2 year and 6 month limitation period on medical
malpractice actions provided by CPLR 214-a(6). See CPLR 214-a(6) (McKinney Supp.
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an accrual date at a time prior to possible realization of the injury.5
Recently, in Martin v. Edwards Labs.,' the Court of Appeals held
that the statute of limitations accrues at the time of the actual
injury in cases involving malfunctioning devices that are designed
to perform a continuing function once inserted or implanted in the
plaintiffs body.7
In Martin, an artificial aortic valve manufactured by the de-
fendant was implanted in the decedent on June 7, 1976.8 He died
on May 15, 1979, allegedly as a result of the disintegration of the
valve and the subsequent accumulation of its component material,
teflon, in his brain." A personal injury action was commenced on
June 1, 1981.10 Initially, the action was dismissed as time-barred,11
but was reinstated by the Supreme Court, which held that the ac-
tion did not accrue until the valve began to break down. 12 The Ap-
pellate Division dismissed the complaint, however, reasoning that
1983-1984). Actions involving a "chemical compound, fixation device or prosthetic aid or
device," however, are excluded. See Flanagan v. Mount Eden Gen. Hosp., 24 N.Y.2d 427,
430, 428 N.E.2d 23, 23, cert. denied, 396 U.S. 837 (1969); supra note 2.
8 See The Survey, 54 ST. JOHN'S L. Rav. 137, 145 (1979); see also Birnbaum, "First
Breath's" Law Gasp: The Discovery Rule in Products Liability Cases, 13 FORUM 279, 279-
90 (1979) (suggesting that the first breath rule is an anachronism). Holding that accrual of a
cause of action occurs at initial contact with a harmful substance has been criticized as
obsolete in an era when environmental and chemical hazards pose long range health threats.
See, e.g., Birnbaum, supra, at 285; Note, Statute of Limitations and Pollutant Injuries;
The Need for a Contemporary Legal Response to Contemporary Technological Failure, 9
HOFSTRA L. REv. 1525, 1538 (1981). See generally Note, Statute of Limitations on Strict
Products Liability Actions in New York, 40 AL. L. Rv. 869, 882 (1976) (discussion of
Victorson v. Bock Laundry Machine Co.).
6 60 N.Y.2d 417, 457 N.E.2d 1150, 469 N.Y.S.2d 923 (1983).
7 Id. at 422, 457 N.E.2d at 1152, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 925.
8 Id.
9 Id. at 423, 457 N.E.2d at 1152, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 925-26. The pathologist who per-
formed the autopsy testified during pretrial examination that he had found teflon in the
decedent's brain identical to that used in the artificial valve. Id. In the doctor's opinion, the
valve had begun to deteriorate, causing the teflon to accumulate in the decedent's brain
within months before his death. Id.
10 Id. at 422, 457 N.E.2d at 1152, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 925. Plaintiff asserted personal injury
and wrongful death claims based on products liability, breach of implied warranty, and neg-
ligence. Id. The wrongful death claim was dismissed because it was not brought within 2
years of death, as required by the statute. Id.; see CPLR 208 (1972).
1 60 N.Y.2d at 422, 457 N.E.2d at 1152, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 925.
12 Id. at 423, 457 N.E.2d at 1152, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 926. On reargument, plaintiff's evi-
dence included testimony by the pathologist who had performed the decedent's autopsy. Id.
See supra note 9. The supreme court reinstated the complaint since disintegration of the
valve allegedly occurred less than 3 years prior to commencement of the action. 60 N.Y.2d
at 423, 457 N.E.2d at 1152, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 926.
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the limitations period had commenced upon implantation.13
In a companion case, Lindsey v. A.H. Robins Co.,"4 a similar
issue arose under facts that involved the insertion of an intrauter-
ine contraceptive device known as a Dalkon Shield.15 The device
caused a pelvic infection that ultimately resulted in the plaintiff's
inability to bear children." Special term granted the defendant-
manufacturer's motion to dismiss the complaint as time-barred."
The Appellate Division reversed the trial court, stating that unlike
ingested, inhaled, or injected substances which assimilate into the
body, an intrauterine device is not inherently harmful, and, thus,
the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the injury has
occurred."'
On appeal, the Court of Appeals held that the statute of limi-
tations began to run on the date of initial injury.19 Writing for the
Court,2 0 Judge Meyer examined the policy considerations that had
led to the adoption of the various accrual rules currently used in
different contexts in New York.21 The Court rejected a discovery
11 Martin v. Edwards Labs., 90 App. Div. 2d 1172, 1173, 459 N.Y.S.2d 142, 143 (4th
Dep't 1983).
14 60 N.Y.2d 417, 457 N.E.2d 1150, 469 N.Y.S.2d 923.
15 Id. at 423, 457 N.E.2d at 1153, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 926. A Dalkon Shield is a circular
plastic device inserted in the uterus to which a braided string is attached. Id.
16 Id. Approximately 2 years after the Dalkon Shield was inserted, a pelvic infection
permanently damaged the plaintiff's ovaries and fallopian tubes. Id.
17 Id. Originally, plaintiff brought suit in a federal court against both the manufacturer
and the treating physician. Id. The suit was discontinued on consent of the parties. Id. In a
subsequent action a motion to dismiss the complaint against the manufacturer was granted,
notwithstanding a physician's affidavit stating that the plaintiff's injury had occured a few
days or weeks prior to diagnosis of the infection. Id. at 424, 457 N.E.2d at 1153, 469
N.Y.S.2d at 926. The defendant physician's motion to dismiss was granted with respect to
events occurring more than 3 years prior to service of the original complaint. Id. In addition,
plaintiff's cross-motion to serve an amended complaint asserting fraud against the manufac-
turer for withholding information regarding the hazardous nature of the shield was denied
as time-barred. Id.
1s Lindsey v. A.H. Robins Co., 91 App. Div. 2d 150, 158, 458 N.Y.S.2d 602, 606 (2d
Dep't 1983).
1s Martin v. Edwards Labs., 60 N.Y.2d 417, 422, 457 N.E.2d 1150, 1153, 469 N.Y.S.2d
923, 925 (1983).
20 Chief Judge Cooke and Judges Jasen, Jones, Wachtler, and Kaye concurred in the
opinion authored by Judge Meyer. Judge Simons took no part in consideration of the case.
11 See 60 N.Y.2d at 425-27, 457 N.E.2d at 1154-55, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 927-28. Judge
Meyer initially postulated that determining a limitation period "depends on a nice balanc-
ing of policy considerations." Id. at 425, 457 N.E.2d at 1154, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 927. The man-
ufacturer's interest in defending a claim before it becomes stale must be balanced against
the injured party's interest in bringing the action before it is time-barred. Id.
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rule,2 suggesting that it is warranted only when the plaintiff is un-
aware of the presence of a foreign object in his body.23 The initial-
contact rule applied in assimilated substances cases was also re-
jected.24 Judge Meyer noted that in cases involving "inhalations,
ingestions or injections," harm begins as soon as the substance en-
ters the body,25 whereas under the facts in the cases at bar, no
harm had occurred until the product malfunctioned.2"
The Court adopted the date-of-injury rule applied in strict
products liability and most negligence actions.27 Judge Meyer lik-
ened inserted but nonassimilated devices to products used outside
the body.28 The Court reasoned that the primary policy considera-
tion for upholding the date-of-injury rule in strict products liabil-
ity cases-the possibility of time-barring valid actions prior to the
22 See id. at 427, 457 N.E.2d at 1155, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 928-29; see also Flanagan v.
Mount Eden Gen. Hosp., 24 N.Y.2d 427, 431-32, 248 N.E.2d 871, 873-74, 301 N.Y.S.2d 23,
26-27 (discussion of foreign object rule), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 837 (1969).
,3 See 60 N.Y.2d at 427, 457 N.E.2d at 1155, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 928. The Court distin-
guished cases based on the foreign object rule by noting that plaintiffs in such cases are not
aware of the presence of the object. Id. at 426, 457 N.E.2d at 1155, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 928. The
Court also noted that in foreign object cases, there is no causal break between the negli-
gence and the resulting injury. Id.; see Flanagan v. Mount Eden Gen. Hosp. 24 N.Y.2d 427,
430, 248 N.E.2d 871, 872-73, 301 N.Y.S.2d 23 26-27, cert. denied, 396 U.S. 837 (1969).
24 60 N.Y.2d at 427, 457 N.E.2d at 1155, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 928.
2" Id.; see, e.g., Schwartz v. Heyden Chem. Corp. 12 N.Y.2d 212, 218-19, 188 N.E.2d
142, 144-45, 237 N.Y.S.2d 714, 718-19, modified on other grounds, 12 N.Y.2d 1073, 190
N.E.2d 153, 239 N.Y.S.2d 896, cert. denied, 374 U.S. 808 (1963); Schmidt v. Merchants Des-
patch Transp. Co., 270 N.Y. 287, 301, 200 N.E. 824, 827 (1936); see supra note 3.
S6 60 N.Y.2d at 427, 457 N.E.2d at 1155, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 928. The Martin Court noted
that underlying the initial contact rule is the recognition that a cause of action arises only
when the injury-producing forces commence. Id. at 425, 457 N.E.2d at 1154, 469 N.Y.S.2d at
928. These forces, the Court reasoned, "are inexorably set in motion when the [harmful]
substance enters and is assimilated into the body." Id. at 427, 457 N.E.2d at 1155, 469
N.Y.S.2d at 928; see supra note 3. According to the Court, in cases where devices have been
inserted or implanted, the forces of harm are not set in motion until the product malfunc-
tions. 60 N.Y.2d at 427, 457 N.E.2d at 1155, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 928.
27 60 N.Y.2d at 426-27, 457 N.E.2d at 1155, 409 N.Y.S.2d at 928. The Martin Court
suggested that an implanted or inserted device causes no injury prior to malfunctioning, and
held therefore that the recipient of such a device stands in the same position as the product
user in Victorson v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 37 N.Y.2d 395, 355 N.E.2d 275, 373 N.Y.S.2d
39 (1975). 60 N.Y.2d at 426-27, 457 N.E.2d at 1155, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 928; see supra note 2.
The primary consideration leading to the Victorson decision was that prior to the malfunc-
tioning of the product, no injury had occurred and, thus, there was no cause of action. 60
N.Y.2d at 426-27, 457 N.E.2d at 1155, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 928.
60 N.Y.2d at 427, 457 N.E.2d at 1155, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 928; see supra note 27. Judge
Meyer also observed that since inserted or implanted devices can be removed and physically
inspected, a degree of protection is afforded to defendant manufacturers faced with the
prospect of confronting stale claims. 60 N.Y.2d at 427, 457 N.E.2d at 1155, 469 N.Y.S.2d at
928.
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occurrence of any injury-applied to actions involving devices that
are implanted or inserted in the body. 9 In both situations, stated
the Court, plaintiffs have no cause of action until the manifesta-
tion of a product defect.30
As was noted by the Martin Court, determining the accrual
date for limitations on personal injury actions involves a balancing
of policy considerations. 1 It is suggested that adopting a discovery
rule in cases involving inserted or implanted devices would better
serve to minimize preclusion of valid claims while imposing no un-
fair burden on defending parties.32 Factors that supported the
adoption of a discovery rule in certain malpractice actions33 in-
clude the actual presence of a foreign object,34 the clear causal rela-
tionship between the product and the injury,"m a minimization of
diagnostic guesswork,3 6 and the patient's ignorance of the presence
29 60 N.Y.2d at 427, 457 N.E.2d at 1155, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 928. Addressing the issue of
barring valid claims prior to accrual, the Martin Court concurred with the rationale in Vic-
torson, stating that "'[t]o hold that [the statute of limitations] somehow came into being
prior [to the injury] would defy both logic and experience.'" Id. at 427, 457 N.E.2d at 1155,
469 N.Y.S.2d at 928 (citing Victorson v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 37 N.Y.2d at 403, 335
N.E.2d at 275, 373 N.Y.S.2d at 43).
30 60 N.Y.2d at 426-27, 457 N.E.2d at 1155, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 928; see supra note 27.
31 60 N.Y.2d at 425, 457 N.E.2d at 1154, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 927; see supra note 21. A
factor to be considered in fixing a time of accrual is the interest of society in repose and
administrative expediency. See Developments in the Law-Statute of Limitations, supra
note 1, at 1204. Yet, this interest pales when compared with an injured person's interest in
an action when it is time-barred before his injury becomes manifest. Id.
32 Cf. CPLR 214-a (1972) (providing for discovery in certain malpractice actions).
While the discovery provision provided in 214-a of the CPLR excludes a "chemical com-
pound, fixation device or prosthetic aid or device," this section applies only to medical mal-
practice actions. CPLR 214-a (McKinney Supp. 1983-1984). The legislature has expressed
its intention that "an exception to the general period of limitation is required when the
pathological effect of an injury occurs without perceptible trauma and the victim is blame-
lessly ignorant of the cause of the injury." Id. But see Beary v. City of Rye, 44 N.Y.2d 398,
414-15, 377 N.E.2d 453, 459, 406 N.Y.S.2d 9, 15 (1978) (enactment of CPLR 214-a evidenced
legislative unwillingness to broaden foreign object discovery rule).
3 See, e.g., supra note 4.
' See 60 N.Y.2d at 426, 457 N.E.2d at 1154, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 928. The ability to remove
the device and examine it for possible malfunctions was said to increase the possibility of
uncovering unfounded claims. Id.; see supra note 28. The discovery rule also has been ex-
tended to malpractice suits where a different type of real evidence, hospital records, are
available for inspection. E.g., Dobbins v. Clifford, 39 App. Div. 2d 1, 4, 330 N.Y.S.2d 743,
746-47 (4th Dep't 1972).
11 See 60 N.Y.2d at 426, 457 N.E.2d at 1155, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 928; Flanagan v. Mount
Eden Gen. Hosp., 24 N.Y.2d 427, 430, 248 N.E.2d 871, 871, 301 N.Y.S.2d 23, 26, cert. de-
nied, 396 U.S. 837 (1969).
36 See 60 N.Y.2d at 426, 457 N.E.2d at 1155, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 928; Flanagan v. Mount
Eden Gen. Hosp., 24 N.Y.2d 427, 431, 248 N.E.2d 871, 871, 301 N.Y.S.2d 23, 26, cert. de-
nied, 396 U.S. 837 (1969). According to the Flanagan Court a claim based on the presence
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of the object inside his body.37 These factors are equally persuasive
in cases of inserted or implanted devices. Since a prosthetic or con-
traceptive device is not assimilated by the body, feigned injuries
can be detected through inspection of the device.3 Retention of
the inserted or implanted device, moreover, allows a causal connec-
tion to be established from empirical data rather than from edu-
cated supposition, 9 and such evidence is not subject to the
problems that arise after a lapse of time.4 ° In addition, knowledge
of the presence of a device in the body does not necessarily impute
knowledge of the symptoms created by possible defects, 41and, thus,
of a foreign object in the body will not raise issues of professional judgment or discretion. 24
N.Y.2d at 431, 248 N.E.2d at 871, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 26. The advantage of avoiding difficult
diagnostic judgments in the determination of the proper date of accrual has led one court to
designate the date of discovery as the appropriate time for injuries suffered due to excessive
radiation. See LeVine v. Isoserve, Inc., 70 Misc. 2d 747, 751-52, 334 N.Y.S.2d 796, 801 (Sup.
Ct. Albany County 1972).
17 See 60 N.Y.2d at 427, 457 N.E.2d at 1155, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 928; Flanagan v. Mount
Eden Gen. Hosp., 24 N.Y.2d 427, 431, 248 N.E.2d 871, 871, 301 N.Y.S. 2d 23, 26, cert. de-
nied, 396 U.S. 837 (1969). The notion of having a cause of action accrue before the plaintiff
has a basis for discovering the existence of a foreign object was said to place "an undue
strain upon common sense, reality, logic, and simple justice." Flanagan, 24 N.Y.2d at 431,
248 N.E.2d at 871, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 26.
60 N.Y.2d at 427, 457 N.E.2d at 1155, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 928. An important similarity
between the Martin case and suits based on foreign objects is that in neither are the devices
assimilated into the body. Id. Consequently, it is possible to remove the device or object,
inspect it for possible malfunctions, and thereby determine the cause of any injury. Id.; see
supra note 28.
31 60 N.Y.2d at 426, 457 N.E.2d at 1155, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 928; see supra note 36 and
accompanying text. It is submitted that the Martin CoUrt's decision to find accrual at the
time of injury runs counter to the goal of eliminating uncertainty in determining accrual
dates. See supra note 1. In determining when actual injury has occurred, "complicated med-
ical questions.., and professional diagnostic judgments [are] implicated," 60 N.Y.2d at
426, 457 N.E.2d at 1155, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 928, which will serve needlessly to protract litiga-
tion and hamper judicial efficiency.
40 60 N.Y.2d at 427, 457 N.E.2d at 1155, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 928. A problem associated
with a lapse of time is that "[m]ost actions for personal injuries depend to a great extent
upon the testimony of witnesses, and the recollection of such witnesses inevitably becomes
less credible." Williams, Limitation Periods on Personal Injury Claims, 48 NoTRE DAn
LAw. 881, 881 (1973); see supra note 1. Evidence such as an actual prosthetic or contracep-
tive device will negate the need to call defendants where "memories have faded, and wit-
nesses have disappeared." Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 321
U.S. 342, 349 (1944). Indeed, a defendant's contention that he will be prejudiced by the
"staleness of evidence" is generally inapplicable in products liability litigation. See Phillips,
An Analysis of Proposed Reform of Products Liability Statutes of Limitations, 56 N.C.L.
Rav. 663, 676 (1978).
41 See, e.g., Murphy v. Saint Charles Hosp., 35 App. Div. 2d 64, 67, 312 N.Y.S.2d 978,
980 (2d Dep't 1970). Accrual at the time of discovery has been extended to situations where
insertion of a device was made with the plaintiff's knowledge. Id. In Murphy, a pin known
as a Moore prosthesis was inserted into the plaintiff's hip in 1963. Id. at 65, 312 N.Y.S.2d at
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it is submitted that a plaintiff's awareness of the mere presence of
the device should not bar application of the discovery rule.
The Martin decision, while not the best solution, does provide
some certainty to an area plagued with uncertainties.42 Neverthe-
less, the equities support adoption of the more progressive discov-
ery rule in cases of implanted or inserted devices as forcefully as in
cases where foreign objects are negligently left in the body.
Vincent W. Crowe
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW
CPL § 170.30: The power to dismiss criminal charges for want of
prosecution does not inhere in the judiciary
Fundamental to every court is the power to regulate its activi-
ties in the interests of judicial efficiency and the preservation of
979. Almost 4 years later, the pin broke. Id. The pin was labeled "akin" to a foreign object
and the plaintiff's knowledge of its insertion was deemed insufficient to prevent extension of
the discovery rule. Id. at 67, 312 N.Y.S.2d at 980. Alternatively, the court held that the
action was timely because there was no injury until the prosthesis broke. Id. Whereas the
plaintiff in Lindsey may have been expected to recognize a cause and effect relationship
between discomfort in her pelvic area and the Dalkon Shield, it is submitted that the plain-
tiff in Martin was not equally apprised of a causal link between the implanted valve and the
head pains he suffered. As has been stated, "insidious diseases are no respecters of jurisdic-
tional boundaries." McLaren, supra note 2 at 268.
It has been noted, in fact, that judicial enactment of a discovery rule in situations of
implanted or inserted devices would be "entirely appropriate.., in the absence of legisla-
tive mandate." Flanagan v. Mount Eden Gen. Hosp., 24 N.Y.2d 427, 435, 248 N.E.2d 871,
876, 301 N.Y.S.2d 23, 29, cert. denied, 396 U.S. 837 (1969); see also Hamilton v. Turner, 377
A.2d 363, 364 (Del. Super. Ct. 1977). In Hamilton, a discovery rule was applied in a case
involving a defective intrauterine device where although plaintiff experienced discomfort,
plaintiff did not connect discomfort to presence of the device. 377 A.2d at 364.
42 See supra note 2 and accompanying text. The Martin court rightfully preserved the
plaintiff's cause of action, and several courts have reached the same result. See, e.g., Klein v.
Dow Coming Corp., 661 F.2d 998, 999 (2d Cir. 1981). In Klein, a woman sued for injuries
suffered when a prosthesis burst in her breast. Id. The fact that the suit was brought 14
years after surgical implantation did not bar the suit, since the court held that the action
accrued at the moment the prosthesis burst. Id.; see also Kristeller v. A.H. Robins, Inc., 560
F. Supp. 831, 833 (N.D.N.Y. 1983) (noting inequity of running statute before injury); Bailey
v. A.H. Robins, Inc., 560 F. Supp. 833, 834 (N.D.N.Y. 1983) (accrual at onset of pelvic in-
flammation allegedly caused by Dalkon Shield).
